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Rewards to prevent supervisors from accepting bribes create incentives for extortion. This 
raises the question whether a supervisor who can engage in bribery and extortion can still be 
useful in providing incentives. By highlighting the role of team work in forging information, 
we present a notion of soft information that makes supervision valuable. We show that a fear 
of inducing extortion may make it optimal to allow bribery, but extortion is never tolerated. 
Even though both increase incentive cost, extortion penalizes the agent after “good behavior”, 
while bribery penalizes the agent after “bad behavior”. Since bribery occurs when a violation 
is detected, the bribe is a penalty for “bad behavior”, and helps somewhat in providing 
incentive. We find that extortion is a more serious issue when incentives are primarily based 
on soft information, when the agent has a greater bargaining power while negotiating an 
illegal payment, or when the agent has weaker outside opportunities. Our analysis provides 
explanations why extortion may be less of a problem in developed countries. 
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In the design of optimal organizations, the fight against corruption by enforcement 
officers relies on strong incentives to detect and report violations by agents.  Such 
incentives raise the specter of extortion since rewards to deter bribery may act as 
inducements to engage in extortion.  Consider the case of an enforcer whose role is to 
detect and report violations by an agent.  Offering a reward to the enforcer for turning in 
the agent will lower his incentive to accept a bribe from that agent.  For instance, a driver 
under the influence of alcohol may attempt to bribe a police officer to let him off the 
hook for a DUI conviction, but a corrupt officer will find it less profitable to accept a 
bribe if he can collect a reward when turning in the drunk driver.
1  Now consider the case 
of an officer catching drivers who run red lights.  Again, a reward would lower his 
incentive to accept a bribe from a driver caught running the light, but the same reward 
may invite a corrupt officer to claim that the driver ran the light when he did not.   
Incentive to deter bribery may lead a corrupt officer to extort innocent drivers.   
Notice the important difference between the nature of evidence in the DUI case 
and the red light case, which turns out to be critical in studying the trade-off between 
deterring bribery and inducing extortion.  In the DUI case, a corrupt officer cannot claim 
that a sober driver is drunk because hard evidence (such as a blood test) is required.  In 
the red light case however, the testimony of the officer may be enough to convict a 
driver.  We will say that the evidence is soft when the officer can forge the evidence (e.g., 
his testimony), either to help a guilty driver in exchange for a bribe or to extort an 
innocent driver.  Evidence that cannot be forged will be described as hard evidence, but 
we allow for hard evidence to be concealed.
2   As we explain below, the distinction 
between hard and soft evidence is key to analyzing the trade-off between bribery and 
extortion, and it is also relevant to many other settings such as financial or tax audits. 
In our model, bribery and extortion differ by how evidence is reported when 
attempting to extract money from an agent.  The enforcer can forge or conceal evidence 
                                                           
1 The reward can be non-monetary such as good reputation, promotion, etc.  Similarly, bribes and extortion 
payments can take the form of favors to members in an organization. 
2 See, e.g., Tirole (1986).  We will make the definitions of hard and soft information precise in the model 
section. 2 
 
in two different ways: (a) make a favorable report about the agent — this will be called 
bribery in this paper; (b) make an unfavorable report about the agent — this will be called 
extortion.  We also use the generic term of corruption to describe bribery and extortion.  
In the legal literature, there is a debate on the definitions of extortion and bribery based 
on who initiates the corrupt transaction.
3  We abstract from this debate because our focus 
is on whether the corrupt behavior helps or hurts the agent as we are mainly interested in 
optimal incentives for the agent. 
The intuition that rewards to enforcement agents may also encourage extortion 
has not played much of a role in the literature on corruption in hierarchies.  Part of the 
problem is in finding an appropriate model in which a supervisor or enforcement agent 
remains useful even though they can engage in extortion.  Tirole (1986) showed that a 
corruptible supervisor can still be useful.  However, his model and much of the 
subsequent literature did not feature the effect of extortion since extortion was not a 
credible threat in these models. 
By introducing an appropriate notion of soft information, we are able to capture 
the above trade-off in a model of extortion in which the supervisor remains useful even 
when there is no external honest enforcement available.  This is our first contribution.  
Our model allows us to derive two main results: (i) extortion should always be deterred 
but bribery should not; (ii) bribery is deterred when information is hard but may be 
allowed when information is soft.  There is an extensive literature in economics dealing 
with bribery but our result that the threat of extortion makes bribery optimal is new.
4  We 
also find that the principal is better off when the agent has less bargaining power when 
negotiating a bribe, and that higher outside opportunities for the agent makes extortion 
less relevant.   
The intuition for our result (i) depends on the fact there is a critical difference in 
the cost of providing incentives to the agent in the presence of bribery as compared to 
extortion.  Even though both increase incentive cost, extortion penalizes the agent after 
                                                           
3 For example, Ayres (1997) argues that in an environment where corruption is endemic, an individual 
initiating a side-payment to an enforcement agent could well be the victim of extortion rather than someone 
attempting to engage in bribery.  See also Lindgren (1993). 
4 See the surveys by Tirole (1992) and Bardhan (1997), and references in Khalil and Lawarree (2006), or 
Silva et al. (2007) for recent contributions. 3 
 
“good behavior”, while bribery penalizes the agent after “bad behavior”.  Since bribery 
occurs when a violation is detected, the bribe is a penalty for “bad behavior”, and helps 
somewhat in providing incentive.  This is in line with the less formal literature that 
suggests that bribes may have some positive role to play but extortion does not (See 
Bardhan (1997)).  Bribery can help “grease” the incentives in badly run organizations 
but, as Klitgaard (1988) noted, “Extortion is a particularly debilitating form of 
corruption.”… “It leads not only to inefficiencies but the alienation of citizens from their 
government.” 
The above suggests extortion is worse than bribery, but it does not say why both 
should not be deterred.  Indeed, in result (ii), we find that even if it is feasible to deter 
both, it is optimal to allow bribery when information is soft.  The intuition can be 
understood in light of the existing literature, even though most of this literature finds that 
deterring bribery is optimal.
5  We explain below why the information structure used in 
the current literature fails to capture the trade-off between extortion and bribery, while 
our information structure succeeds by emphasizing the role of teamwork in forging 
information. 
Consider a standard moral hazard model with a supervisor who monitors the 
agent’s performance ex post.  Suppose, as in Tirole (1986), that the supervisor either 
finds hard evidence (positive or negative) or finds no conclusive evidence.  With hard 
evidence, the supervisor can conceal information and pretend she has found no 
conclusive evidence but she cannot forge evidence.  So, if the supervisor has no 
conclusive evidence, she has no discretion and no bribery or extortion can occur.  If the 
supervisor has incriminating evidence, the agent will want to bribe the supervisor to 
conceal it.  However, this can be deterred without inducing a threat of extortion by 
rewarding the supervisor only for producing incriminating evidence.  Consequently, if 
she has positive evidence about the agent and wants to threaten to extort by concealing it, 
her threat is not credible.  This is because she will not be rewarded if she reports no 
conclusive evidence.  Therefore extortion is not an issue.   
                                                           
5 Our focus is on the agency literature that followed the pioneering work by Tirole (1986, 1992) as opposed 
to the non-agency literature (as reviewed in Bardhan (1997)).   4 
 
By assuming that information is hard, the previous literature has mainly 
emphasized that it may be relatively easy (even costless) to conceal or ignore information 
but that it is prohibitively costly to forge it.  In reality, there is often an asymmetry in the 
cost of forging information if the supervisor tries to do it alone or if she has help from the 
agent.  In many circumstances the cost of forging can be significantly lowered with the 
help of the agent.  Consider the previous example of the blood test taken after a car 
accident.  If the police officer or the lab worker colludes with the driver, they can easily 
substitute another untainted blood sample.  This means that information can be more 
easily manipulated when several people collaborate. 
In this paper, we emphasize that forging of information is a team activity by the 
supervisor and the agent.  A supervisor alone may find it very costly to forge information 
by herself but very cheap when she can collaborate with the agent.  Information that is 
hard for the supervisor can become soft for the supervisor-agent coalition.  Our approach 
is in the spirit of Dewatripont and Tirole (2005) who emphasize that conveying evidence 
is a team activity.  Dewatripont and Tirole argue that the sender and the receiver, working 
together as a team, can make soft information hard.  Because our focus is on fraud, we 
look at the opposite issue: can hard information be made soft?  We consider a situation 
where the team members (supervisor and agent) would find it prohibitively costly to 
forge information alone but very inexpensive if they can work together. 
To deter the coalition from forging evidence, the principal has to pay the 
supervisor a new reward in addition to the reward for producing incriminating evidence.  
The new reward goes to the supervisor when she reports no conclusive evidence.  It also 
makes extortion credible when the supervisor has positive evidence and threatens to 
conceal it.  The trade-off between bribery and extortion appears when information is soft, 
and we find that bribery occurs in equilibrium. 
Technically, bribery occurs because of non-separabilities in the constraints that 
deter corruption (Tirole (1992)).  We find that the constraints that would be imposed to 
deter bribery are interlinked with the constraints imposed to deter extortion.  We show 
that it is more profitable to allow bribery than to deter both forms of corruption.   5 
 
Soft information is not often used in models of supervision since the supervisor 
would become useless if she could forge evidence alone.  In our model only the coalition 
can forge evidence, not the supervisor alone.  Notice that the agent will not agree to help 
forge unfavorable evidence. Hence, soft information is not useless because the principal 
can exploit the incongruence between the team members' objectives (see Dewatripont and 
Tirole (2005)).   
One important implication of our analysis is that the fight against bribery should 
be rooted in making information hard.  Most of the literature following Tirole has 
focused on the problem of bribery in models where extortion is not relevant, i.e., not a 
credible threat.
6  Other than special circumstances, the literature largely finds that it is 
optimal to deter bribery.
7  Therefore, we contribute to this literature by pointing out that 
if information is soft, the threat of extortion may make it optimal to allow bribery.   
This is consistent with the fact that extortion is mainly a problem in less 
developed countries relying mostly on soft evidence, while in developed countries hard 
evidence is more common and it is mainly bribery that makes the news.  In the financial 
world for instance, making information hard can take various forms and be represented 
by the use of institutions like lawyers, CPAs, auditors, bankruptcy courts, independent 
directors and legal actions by the shareholders (see the survey paper by La Porta et al. 
(2000)). 
We consider extensions of the model to derive further results.  Extortion is a less 
serious issue when the agent has less bargaining power or stronger outside opportunities.  
A lesser bargaining power hurts the agent as the supervisor can extract a larger bribe.  
The bribe is a more effective deterrent and the principal has to give a smaller reward to 
deter bribery.  Since it was this reward that induced extortion, extortion is less of an 
                                                           
6 For instance in Kessler (2000) and Vafai (2005), the information is hard.  Baliga (1999) analyzes the case 
of soft information but extortion does not increase the implementation costs because the mechanism of the 
game allows the agent to quit when faced with the possibility of extortion.  See also Faure Grimaud, 
Laffont and Martimort (2003) for a model of soft information with asymmetric information between the 
supervisor and the agent. In Kofman and Lawarree (1993) the information structure allows forging of 
evidence but rules out extortion by assumption. 
7 Several papers have shown that it may be optimal to allow bribery because of restrictions on contracts.  
For instance, Kofman and Lawarree (1996) (uncertain auditor type); Che (1995) and Mookherjee and Png 
(1995) (auditor moral hazard); Strausz (1997), Olsen and Torsvik (1998), Lambert-Mogiliansky (1998), 
and Khalil and Lawarree (2006) (renegotiation and no-commitment). 6 
 
issue.  Better outside opportunities also make extortion less of an issue as they increase 
the agent’s reservation utility and help protect the agent from the supervisor’s extortion 
attempts.  A higher reservation utility forces the principal to increase the risk-averse 
agent’s wage while making it less dependent on the supervisor’s report.  We show that 
with strong enough outside opportunities, the agent’s wage is independent of the 
supervisor’s report unless it reveals shirking and extortion is no longer a threat for the 
agent.  Again, this seems consistent with evidence that extortion is mainly a problem in 
less developed countries where agents have weaker outside opportunities. 
To be sure, there is a pre-existing literature on extortion.  Besides the non-agency 
literature (see Bardhan (1997)), there are two main types of models of extortion in agency 
settings.  In the literature on so-called ‘red tape’, officials harass citizens by setting up 
bureaucratic hurdles to extract money.  In such models, the principal delegates to the 
bureaucrat the ability to design part of the incentive scheme, for instance by deciding 
how much red tape to impose (see, e.g., Banerjee (1997), and Guriev (2004)).  Our paper 
belongs to the other type of models, where the supervisor only has an information 
gathering role.  In this literature, two recent papers feature extortion in different settings 
and with a different focus than ours.  Polinsky and Shavell (2001) study an optimal law 
enforcement problem, while Hindriks et al. (1999) consider a tax-evasion model with a 
focus on the redistributive properties of the tax scheme.  To deter corruption, both papers 
rely on the availability of incorruptible external enforcement agents and the penalties they 
can impose.  Instead, we focus on internal mechanisms to deter bribery and extortion by 
developing an informational structure that makes a supervisor useful even though she can 
engage in bribery and extortion and incorruptible external enforcers are absent.  
 
2. The  Setup 
We present a standard principal/supervisor/agent hierarchy with a key new feature that 
makes extortion relevant.  The principal (it) is the owner of a firm, the agent (he) is the 
productive unit in the firm, and the supervisor (she) collects information for the principal.  
The agent produces an output x which depends on his level of effort, e ∈ {0, 1}.  If the 
agent works, that is, e = 1, he produces xH with probability π and xL with probability 1 – π, 7 
 
where xH – xL =  Δx > 0, and π ∈ (0, 1).  If he shirks, that is, e = 0, he produces xL with 
probability one.
8  While the level of output x is observed by all parties, the level of effort 
e is private information of the agent.  The agent’s disutility of effort is given by ϕ  e, 
where ϕ > 0.  The output belongs to the principal, who pays a transfer w to the agent.  
We assume that the agent is risk averse with a separable utility function given by U(w, e) 
= u(w) – ϕ e, where u is concave, u(0) = 0, and satisfies the Inada conditions (u′(0) = + ∞ 
and u′(+ ∞) = 0).  The principal who is risk-neutral offers a take-it-or-leave-it contract to 
the agent, who has zero reservation utility.
9  We assume that Δx is large enough that it is 
always profitable to induce the agent to work, that is, exert e  = 1.  The principal’s 
objective is to minimize its expected cost of inducing e = 1.   
In the absence of a supervisor, the contract for the agent could only be based on x 
and the wages would be wL when xL is produced and wH when xH is produced.  In this 
model, the optimal contract in the absence of a supervisor — we refer to it as the second-
best contract — requires that 
1(/)
s
H wu ϕ π
− =  and  0
s
L w = .  In other words, the principal 
compensates the agent only when there is definitive evidence that the agent worked, i.e., 
when xH is realized.  The agent does not obtain any rent.  
The supervisor’s role is to collect information about the agent’s effort level and to 
report it to the principal.  Since xH can be realized only with e = 1, there is no reason to 
use the supervisor following xH, and the principal will send the supervisor only when it 
observes xL.  Following Tirole (1986), we assume that the supervisor observes the true 
level of effort with probability p or obtains no conclusive evidence with probability 1 – p, 
where p ∈ (0, 1).  The supervisor’s signal σ can take three values: σ ∈ {0, ∅, 1}, where ∅ 
denotes that the supervisor does not have conclusive evidence about effort.  Therefore, 
the agent is given a wage wH following xH, and wr, following xL, where r is the 
supervisor's report with r ∈ {0, ∅, 1}.  We assume that the supervisor is costless but the 
principal may want to pay her a wage s to deter corruption.  The supervisor is risk neutral.  
Without loss of generality, the wage to the supervisor depends only on her own report 
                                                           
8 In section 5, we show that our main results are robust to a more general production function. 
9 We consider the case of a strictly positive reservation utility in section 5. 8 
 
and is denoted by sr.  We assume that the supervisor’s reservation utility is zero.  Both 
the agent and supervisor are protected by limited liability such that wr ≥ 0 and sr ≥ 0.
 10 
Supervision Technology and Corruption: key assumption 
The supervisor is corrupt in the sense that she may not always report what she has 
observed to the principal.  She will report the truth only if it is in her interest to do so.  In 
this environment, we identify two types of corrupt behavior, which we define below: 
Definition 1. Bribery occurs when one party accepts a payment in return for misreporting 
information in favor of the other party. 
Definition 2. Extortion occurs when the supervisor obtains a payment from the agent by 
threatening to misreport evidence that was favorable to the agent.  We say framing has 
occurred if the attempt at extortion fails and the supervisor misreports information that 
was favorable to the agent. 
Bribery and extortion are accompanied by side-contracts between the supervisor 
and the agent whereas framing is not.  With bribery, the supervisor and agent forge 
information to maximize their joint surplus.  With extortion (resp. framing), the 
supervisor acts alone by threatening to suppress (resp. actually suppress) evidence since 
she is acting against the agent’s interest.   
We depart from the literature on monitoring that relies on hard information, which 
mainly captures the idea that it is relatively easy to conceal but very costly to forge 
information.  In the spirit of the recent literature on communication (Dewatripont-Tirole 
(2005) or Caillaud-Tirole (2007)), we emphasize that forging information is a team 
activity, and the cost of forging depends on the amount of help from team members.  As 
argued in the introduction, it can be relatively easy to forge when the supervisor can 
enroll the help of the agent, but very expensive if the supervisor tries to do it alone.
11  In 
our model, the supervisor cannot forge information by herself but can only conceal it.  
Her information is hard.   If σ  = e, she can only report r ∈ {e, ∅}, and if σ = ∅, the only 
                                                           
10 Without limited liability, the first best could be reached since e = 0 is off the equilibrium path.  When the 
supervisor reports that e = 0, the principal can impose an infinite punishment on the agent, and also give a 
large reward to the supervisor if she is corruptible.  
11 In financial auditing for instance, the auditee can help the auditor draw “favorable samples.” 9 
 
possible report is r = ∅.  Thus, extortion involves threatening to suppress information 
favorable to the agent.  With the agent’s cooperation, the supervisor can forge evidence 
and report that the agent has worked regardless of what she observed, i.e., it is possible to 
have r ∈ {0, ∅, 1} regardless of σ.  The information is soft for the coalition. 
It may seem counterintuitive that to make extortion by the supervisor relevant, 
information has to be soft for the coalition while it is hard for the supervisor.  However, 
this assumption is critical because supervisory extortion would not be an issue if the 
information were either soft or hard.  If the information were soft for the supervisor, the 
supervisor would be useless.  If the information were hard for both the supervisor and the 
coalition, extortion would not be relevant.  This is because a threat of extortion is credible 
only if the supervisor is able to collect a reward by suppressing information.  Since 
evidence cannot be forged, the supervisor has no discretion when σ = ∅, and there is no 
need to reward the supervisor when σ = ∅.  Therefore, the threat of extortion by 
suppressing evidence is vacuous in a model with hard information as it is the case in 
many prominent models like Tirole (1986, 1992) or Kessler (2000). 
Besides the standard assumption of enforceable side-contracts (see Tirole 1992), 
we need to make one additional assumption.  Since bribery may occur in equilibrium, we 
need to be explicit in how side transfers are determined.  We assume they are determined 
according to the Nash bargaining solution.  We require that extortion or framing be 
sequentially rational; the supervisor's threat of suppressing information is credible only if 
she receives a higher utility by suppressing evidence than by revealing it truthfully.  
We summarize the model by presenting the timing of moves:  
(1) The principal offers a contract specifying the transfers to the agent as a function of 
output and the supervisor’s report; and the transfers to the supervisor as a function of her 
report. 
(2) The agent and the supervisor accept/reject the contract. 
(3) The agent decides whether to work (e = 1) or shirk (e = 0). 
(4) Output x  is realized.  If the principal observes xL, it sends the supervisor.  If it 
observes xH, the game moves to (8). 
(5) The supervisor and the agent observe the signal σ. 10 
 
(6) The supervisor and the agent choose whether or not to make a side-contract. 
(7) The supervisor makes a report r. 
(8) Transfers are realized. 
 
3. Trade-off between Bribery and Extortion 
In this section we will argue that rewards to deter bribery will lead to extortion, but that it 
is feasible to deter both.  In section 4, we show that it is optimal to allow bribery but not 
extortion.  First, we briefly present the case where the supervisor is incorruptible.   
If the supervisor were incorruptible, the optimal contract would specify that the 
supervisor will not be paid any reward, sr = 0, for all r.  The agent would only be 
rewarded when there is definitive evidence of effort, i.e., if xH occurs or if xL occurs but 
the supervisor finds evidence of work (r = 1); the agent will be paid zero otherwise.  The 
agent does not obtain any rent and he is equally compensated when xH is realized and 
when r = 1 with xL, i.e., wH = w1 > 0 = w∅ = w0 (see appendix A for details of the 
incorruptible-supervisor contract).  Compared with the second-best or no-supervisor case, 
the agent receives a positive wage more often, and therefore, his wage after xH is smaller 
than under the second best.  Given the effort e = 1, the agent obtains better insurance, and 
that reduces the principal's expected wage payment relative to the second-best contract.  
This contract, however, is vulnerable to bribery.  The supervisor is not being 
rewarded (sr = 0) since she is assumed to be truthful.  If the supervisor is corruptible
12, 
the agent will bribe the supervisor when she finds no-evidence or evidence of shirking, 
and help her fabricate evidence to give a report of work (r = 1) so that they can share the 
higher wage w1 collected by the agent.   
On first sight, this threat of bribery can be combated by introducing a reward for 
the supervisor when she reports shirking (r = 0) or no-evidence (r =∅).  If the reward is 
equal to w1 (i.e., s0 = s∅ = w1), there will be no incentive to bribe.  The supervisor is 
turned into a bounty hunter as in, e.g., Tirole (1986) or Kofman and Lawarrée (1993).  
However, in our framework, this would introduce a new problem of extortion by the 
                                                           
12 It is common knowledge that the supervisor is corruptible. For a dynamic model where the supervisor 
privately knows her propensity for corruption, see Carrillo (2000). 11 
 
supervisor.  To see this, note first that s1 = 0 since there is no perceived threat of a bribe 
from the agent when σ = 1.  Thus, when she has evidence of work, the supervisor will 
have an incentive to suppress this evidence to obtain the reward s∅ > 0 rather than get s1 
= 0.
13   That is, we see the emergence of the trade-off that we alluded to in the 
introduction, namely, strong incentives to deter bribes creates scope for a new kind of 
corruption, namely extortion.  As noted above, this trade-off would not appear if we had 
assumed that information is hard (e.g., Tirole (1986), (1992), and Kessler (2000)).
14   
Next we present the contract where the principal deters both bribery and extortion. 
However, we also show later that this contract is not optimal. 
The least-cost-corruption-proof (LCCP) contract: no bribery or extortion 
It is not clear a priori whether it is optimal to deter all types of corruption.  In particular, 
we have already shown above that rewards for deterring bribery can encourage 
extortion/framing, which means there is a trade-off in deterring different kinds of 
corruption. To study this trade-off, it is useful to characterize as a benchmark the least-
cost-corruption-proof contract that deters both types of corrupt behavior.  The LCCP 
contract is also a critical step when we derive the optimal contract in the next section.  
We show in Lemma 2 that the LCCP contract dominates any contract that allows 
extortion to occur in equilibrium.  The main implication of deterring both bribery and 
extortion is that the principal loses much of the value of retaining a supervisor.  It cannot 
fully utilize the information provided by the supervisor to differentiate the agent’s 
payments according to realized states.  We show later that the LCCP contract is not 
optimal in general, but it can be under specific conditions, e.g., if the agent had all the 
bargaining power when negotiating the side-contract, and if the agent’s outside 
opportunity is high enough (see Section 5). 
                                                           
13 Anticipating extortion the agent will refuse to put in high effort (his incentive constraint will be violated).  
Note also that raising s1 to s∅ is problematic since it would encourage the coalition to report r = 1 when σ = 
∅. 
14 There is a series of papers by Vafai (cited in Vafai (2005)) analyzing extortion under hard information.  
To make extortion credible Vafai relies on the “prohibitive psychological or emotional cost” of not carrying 
out a threat and he shows that bribery can be deterred without cost.   12 
 
Before presenting the principal’s problem with its traditional incentive and 
participation constraints, we first need to consider the last stage with bribery and 
extortion.  To prevent bribery the principal will have to ensure that the contract satisfies 
the Coalition Incentive Compatibility (CIC) constraints. 
(CICσ, r)   Tσ ≥ Tr,   where Tσ = wσ + sσ, Tr = wr + sr,  forσ, r ∈ {0, ∅, 1}. 
We have six (CIC) constraints and these can be satisfied only when T0 = T∅ = T1, i.e., the 
aggregate transfers in every state following xL must be the same.  This can also be written 
as: 
  w 0 + s0 = w1 + s1, =>    s0 = w1 + s1 – w0      (1) 
  w ∅ + s∅ = w1 + s1, =>   s∅ = w1 + s1 – w∅      (2) 
Since extortion/framing may occur only by suppressing evidence when σ ∈ {0, 1},  
the principal will have to ensure that the contract satisfies two additional 
extortion/framing deterring (EF) constraints to prevent extortion/framing.  These can be 
written as: 
(EF1)     s1 ≥ s∅, 
(EF0)     s0 ≥ s∅. 
If one of the above constraints is not satisfied, the supervisor will choose to either extort 
or frame the agent, whichever gives her a higher payoff.  Note however that only (EF1) is 
the relevant constraint for deterring extortion since it deters suppression of positive 
evidence.  The constraint (EF0) deters suppression of negative information, and bribery is 
the pertinent issue.  Therefore, we will ignore the (EF0) constraint and just verify ex post 
that it is satisfied by our identified solutions in each case below.  We also assume that the 
agent and the supervisor do not collude when they are indifferent between colluding and 
not colluding, and the supervisor will not extort when she is indifferent.
15  
                                                           
15 This is a standard assumption that relies on the fact that the principal can always break the tie with a 
small extra payment. 13 
 
Given the (CIC) and (EF) constraints the agent’s participation and incentive 
constraints and the supervisor’s participation constraint are the same as those in the 
incorruptible supervisor case discussed above:  
(IR)     πu(wH) + (1 – π) [pu(w1) + (1 – p) u(w∅)] – ϕ ≥  0, 
(IC)     πu(wH) + (1 – π) [pu(w1) + (1 – p) u(w∅)] – ϕ ≥  pu(w0) + (1 – p) u(w∅,) 
 or,    πu(wH) + (1 – π) pu(w1) – π(1 – p) u(w∅) – pu(w0) ≥  ϕ . 
We can now present the principal’s program – denoted by P
o – which prevents 
both bribery and extortion/framing.
16  
Min  π(wH) + (1 – π) [p(w1 + s1) + (1 – p) (w∅ + s∅)]  
s.t. (IC), (1), (2), (EF1), (EF0), wH ≥ 0, wr ≥ 0 and sr ≥ 0,  
where r ∈ {0, ∅, 1} 
The solution to this problem is the least-cost-corruption-proof contract and it is 
characterized in the following lemma: 
Lemma 1  The least-cost-corruption-proof (LCCP) contract has the following features: 
(i) If the supervisor’s signal is not very accurate (p ≤ π), the contract is equivalent to the 
second-best or no-supervisor contract of section 3. 
(ii) If the supervisor’s signal is accurate enough (p > π), it is optimal to use the 
supervisor, and the contract to the agent satisfies: 
10 0
oo o o




















  i.e., the agent obtains an ex ante rent. 
•  The supervisor's contract involves:  
10 1 0
oo o o ss sw
∅ == <= 
but the supervisor receives no ex ante rent.
17 
•  The principal’s expected cost is C
o = π(w
o
H) + (1 – π)w
o
1. 
                                                           
16 We can ignore the IR constraints as they are implied by the IC and the limited liability constraints. 
17 Since the agent does not shirk in equilibrium, the signal σ = 0 is off the equilibrium path, and the 
supervisor’s rent is zero even though s0 > 0.   14 
 
Proof: See Appendix B. 
There are two main findings from this lemma: (a) the threat of extortion restricts 
the principal’s ability to use the supervisor’s information, and (b) the supervisor will be 
used only if she is accurate enough.  We explain these below in turn.   
It is no longer possible to only reward the agent after definitive evidence of work, 
and the agent who shirks without being caught must also be treated as if he worked.  As 
we argued earlier, rewards for turning down bribes introduce incentive to extort/frame.  
In particular, a reward to the supervisor for reporting σ = ∅ truthfully would encourage 
the supervisor to extort/frame when σ = 1.  This incentive is avoided by reducing s∅ to 
zero, but then the (CIC) requires that w∅ = w1.   
The agent gets a high wage w1 (= w∅) with probability 1 – p even when he shirks 
since the supervisor is not perfectly accurate, which implies that the supervisor may not 
be useful if she is not accurate enough.  This is different from the case of the 
incorruptible supervisor where she is useful for any p > 0.  If the agent works, he gets w1 
with probability (1 – π)(p + (1 – p)) = 1 – π.  The net effect on the (IC) can be seen by 
setting w∅ = w1 and rearranging terms: 
πu(wH) + (p – π)u(w1) = ϕ . 
If p ≤ π, the agent is more likely to receive the transfer w1 when he shirks rather than 
when he works, in which case it would be optimal to set w1 = 0.  We have w1 = w∅ = w0 
= 0, and the principal does not rely on the supervisor’s report at all, and we also have sr = 
0 for all r.  Thus, the contract is equivalent to the second-best contract. 
On the contrary, if p > π, paying a positive w1 is useful in providing incentive to 
the agent since he is more likely to receive a positive transfer when he works.  However, 
this is costly to the principal since it also pays a positive w∅ (= w1) and therefore it is 




H.  The expected cost for the principal is smaller than under the 
second best, but higher than the case with an incorruptible supervisor.  
Note that it is not the supervisor but the agent who benefits from the supervisor’s 
ability to misreport information under the corruption-proof contract.  The reason is as 15 
 
follows; the only way to prevent both bribery and extortion/framing is to give up the 
informativeness of r = ∅ and treat it as if r = 1 in shaping the agent’s incentives.  Thus 
the supervisor cannot affect the agent’s payoff by misreporting that r = ∅ when σ  = 1.  
As a result, she cannot command any rent. The agent who is the potential victim, on the 
contrary, obtains a higher utility than his reservation level.  Otherwise the agent will shirk 
and get w1 ( = w∅) with probability 1 – p. 
 
4. The Optimal Contract: Bribery in Equilibrium 
In this section we characterize the optimal contract when the supervisor can engage in 
both types of corruption.  The principal has the fall-back option of offering the second-
best or no-supervisor contract and ignore the supervisor's report, but we know that the 
least-cost corruption-proof contract dominates this contract when p > π, i.e., when she is 
accurate enough.  Therefore, the interesting question is whether it is possible to improve 
upon the least-cost corruption-proof contract by allowing some type of corruption.
18   
  Since we allow for the possibility of corruption to occur in equilibrium, we have 
to account for payoffs resulting from side contracts.  We assume that when the agent and 
supervisor engage in a side contract, their payoffs are determined by the Nash bargaining 
solution.  For example, if the agent bribes the supervisor to report work (r = 1) when 
there is no evidence (σ = ∅), the coalition will get s1 + w1 which they will share.  This 
implies that the agent’s payoff when σ = ∅ and r = 1 is not w1, but rather the outcome 
from Nash bargaining.  Therefore, all the computations, and particularly the agent’s (IC) 
constraint, have to be re-derived using the relevant Nash bargaining payoffs.  They are 
presented in detail in the appendix and we only outline the main intuition here in the text.  
We first prove that extortion will never be allowed: 
Lemma 2: Any contract that induces e = 1, but violates (EF1) is strictly dominated by the 
least-cost corruption-proof contract. 
Proof: See Appendix C. 
                                                           
18 Note that if it is possible to improve on the corruption-proof contract, it will be optimal to use the 
supervisor even when p < π , but for high enough p. 16 
 
The intuition for never allowing extortion is that it appears as a penalty after the 
agent has done the right thing, i.e., exerted effort.  Thus extortion makes it difficult for 
the principal to reward the agent for his effort and increases the cost of providing 
incentive.  Technically (see Appendix C), this is seen from the outcome of the Nash 
bargaining between the agent and supervisor when (EF1) is violated.  If (EF1) is violated, 
i.e., if the threat to report ∅ when σ = 1 is credible, we show that the agent gets the same 
payoff from the Nash bargaining whether the state is ∅ or 1.  Therefore, the supervisor's 
report is not useful in distinguishing between these states and the agent has less incentive 
to provide effort.  As shown in our lemma 1, the least-cost corruption-proof contract does 
not distinguish between ∅ and 1 either but it is less costly to the principal since the 
supervisor is not rewarded (s1 = s∅ = 0).  Therefore the least-cost corruption-proof 
contract dominates any contract that induces extortion. 
We can now present our main result showing that allowing some bribery is indeed 
optimal, but allowing extortion is not, which is a novel result in the literature.  
Proposition 1: It is optimal to use the supervisor if p > π.  If the agent does not have all 
the bargaining power, the optimal contract induces bribery when the signal σ = ∅, but 
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Proof: See Appendix D. 
 
                                                           
19 In the Appendix, we define w1∅ as the agent’s payoff in state σ = ∅ as a result of Nash bargaining and 




The reason bribery may help is it provides an indirect way to create a variation in 
the agent’s payoff when direct attempts by the principal would induce extortion.  Note 
from our lemma 1 that the only way to deter all corruption is by not utilizing every piece 
of information provided by the supervisor.  In particular, the principal can no longer pay 
the agent only after definitive evidence of work.  The agent receives the same 
compensation when the signal is ∅ and 1 even though the supervisor reports truthfully.  
This raises the cost of providing incentive to the agent since a shirking agent will also 
obtain a positive compensation when the signal is inconclusive about the true effort.  A 
way to restore some variation in the agent's compensation between the states ∅ and 1 is 
by allowing bribery to occur in state ∅. Suppose a bribe from the agent leads the 
supervisor to overstate performance in state ∅ and report 1.  Then the principal will make 
the same aggregate transfer in both states ∅ and 1, but the agent's payoff in state ∅ is 
lowered since he has to pay a bribe to the supervisor, and this lowers the cost of inducing 
high effort.
20  
We now discuss why Tirole’s bribery-proofness (or collusion-proofness in his 
terminology) principle fails.  Tirole (1986 and 1992) shows that, under some 
circumstances, there is no loss of generality to derive an optimal contract that is bribery-
proof.  The principal can anticipate the side-contracts between the agents and give 
adequate incentives not to collude by replicating the payoffs associated with side 
contracts.  However, bribery may occur in equilibrium due to what Tirole has referred to 
as non-separabilities in the constraints that deter corruption (section 2.5, Tirole 1992).  
When these constraints are interlinked, satisfying one constraint raises the cost of 
satisfying another one and it may be too costly to satisfy them all. 
In our case it is the interaction between the collusion (CIC) and extortion (EF) 
constraints that causes the collusion-proofness principle to fail.  To prevent forging of 
                                                           
20  Polinsky and Shavell (2001) find that, depending on parameter values, it may be optimal to allow 
extortion/framing and deter bribery.  Their model is very different from ours and relies on incorruptible 
external enforcers to detect corruption.  More specifically, the principal can choose different probabilities 
of detecting bribery, framing, and extortion, and also choose different levels of sanctions for each offence.  
They also introduce another parameter θ that determines how likely an innocent agent will be in a position 
to be framed.  The relative values of these parameters may make it optimal to deter bribery and allow 
extortion/framing.  For instance if the parameter θ is very small, then allowing extortion/faming is not very 
costly, and the principal should focus on deterring bribery. 18 
 
evidence in state σ = ∅, and reporting r = 1, the principal has to increase the reward s∅, 
but this increases the cost of deterring extortion in state σ = 1 since the principal has to 
maintain s1 ≥ s∅.
21  As argued above and in the LCCP contract, the only way to prevent 
both forms of misreporting is to require w1 = w∅, which is very costly in terms of 
providing incentive to the agent.  With such interlinked-constraints, we show that it is 
cheaper to allow collusion than to fight it.  Bribery allows the principal to create a 
variation in the agent’s payoffs without inducing extortion. 
This captures nicely an intuition often mentioned in the applied literature, that 
allowing bribery can create markets that improves incentives (Bardhan (1997)).  Here, the 
principal relies on the supervisor to extract a bribe from the agent and lower the agent's 
payoff in state ∅, when it cannot directly do so in fear of encouraging extortion.  The 
latter is also consistent with the widely held belief that extortion is always counter 
productive since it penalizes agents when they have obeyed rules or done what they are 
supposed to.  Extortion punishes the agent when he has done the “right thing”, while 




5.1.   Agent’s bargaining power hurts the principal 
 
When bribery is deterred, the bargaining power of the coalition members does not matter.  
The principal competes with the agent for the supervisor’s report and the reward given to 
the supervisor must exceed any viable offer from the agent.  In our model the bargaining 
power is relevant since the principal lets bribery occur in equilibrium.  We show that the 
principal is better off when the supervisor has relatively more bargaining power.  The 
reason is that the supervisor can extract a larger bribe from the agent, which makes the 
bribe a more effective penalty and allows the principal to improve incentives. 
The principal would like to implement a wage differential based on realized states 
to provide incentive to the agent, which is the agent’s stake in bribery.  A reward to deter 
bribery raises the problem of extortion.  Hence, the principal implements a payoff 
                                                           
21 In state σ = ∅, the principal needs to satisfy s∅ ≥ s1 + w1 - w∅ ≥ 0, which increases the cost of deterring 
extortion in state σ = 1. 19 
 
differential for the agent by inducing bribery, which acts as a penalty on the agent.  The 
agent’s bargaining power hinders the principal’s ability to use the bribe as a penalty.  If 
the agent had no bargaining power, the bribe would be equal to the stake of bribery, the 
wage difference, and the threat of extortion would not add any cost in providing incentive.  
On the other hand, if the agent has all the bargaining power, a bribe is useless in 
generating a payoff difference since the bribe would be zero or negligible.  Then, the 
principal may as well deter both forms of corruption since it does not gain from inducing 
bribery (the LCCP contract is optimal). 
To see the precise argument, recall from the incorruptible supervisor benchmark 
that the principal would prefer to make the agent’s payoff zero in state ∅.  This is because 
the state ∅ is relatively more likely to occur when the agent shirks compared to when he 
works.  In the optimal contract, the agent earns a positive return kw1 from Nash 
bargaining in state ∅.  As the agent’s bargaining power goes down, he earns a smaller 
return in state ∅, which implies that the (IC) becomes slack and this allows the principal 
to increase its payoff by adjusting the transfers. 
If the agent’s bargaining power is reduced down to zero, we can argue that 
extortion would not impose additional cost on the principal as his payoff is identical to 
what it would have been in the hypothetical case where extortion could be deterred at 
zero cost.
22  As the agent’s bargaining power goes down, the agent retains a smaller and 
smaller share of w1 in state ∅ as part of his Nash bargaining outcome.  When his 
bargaining power is zero, his share of w1 is also zero and the entire w1 is taken by the 
supervisor as a bribe and the agent is left with a zero payoff in state ∅.  In the 
hypothetical case where extortion could be deterred at zero cost, the principal does not 
have to worry about extortion by assumption and can deter bribery by paying s∅ = w1.  
There would be no difference between the optimal contract where the agent has zero 
bargaining power and the optimal contract if extortion could be deterred at zero cost.  
Thus we conclude that the threat of extortion introduces additional cost on the principal 
only if the agent has bargaining power.   
                                                           
22 For example because there is a very efficient appeals process that the agent can utilize if he is extorted. 20 
 
At the other extreme, if the agent has all the bargaining power, allowing bribery in 
equilibrium has no deterrent effect since the agent gets the entire w1 when they misreport.  
Therefore, the bribe does not create a variation in the agent’s payoff, the raison d’être of 
allowing bribery in the first place.  If the agent has all the bargaining power, the 
principal’s payoff is identical to its payoff under the LCCP contract where w1 = w∅.  The 
principal does not gain by allowing bribery, and is as well off as it deters all forms of 
corruption.  Our findings are summarized in proposition 2: 
Proposition 2: (i) The principal’s payoff increases with the supervisor’s bargaining 
power.  (ii) At the limit, if the supervisor has all the bargaining power, the principal’s 
payoff is identical to the case where extortion could be deterred at zero cost.  (iii) At the 
other limit, if the agent has all the bargaining power, the principal’s payoff is identical to 
the payoff under the least-cost-corruption-proof (LCCP) contract. 
Proof: See Appendix E. 
 
5.2 Better outside opportunities make extortion less relevant  
 
Previously we suggested that more developed counties can rely more intensively on hard 
evidence and therefore suffer less from extortion.  In this section, we provide another 
possible explanation why extortion is less of a problem in more developed countries.  We 
show that if the agent has better outside opportunities, he is less likely to be the target of 
extortion.  The reason is that the wage of an agent with better outside opportunities has to 
be raised to satisfy the higher reservation utility.  With a risk averse agent, the most 
efficient way to increase his expected utility is by reducing the variation in the wages on 
the equilibrium path and relying on the low wage off the equilibrium path to provide 
incentives.  This implies that the agent’s wage when the supervisor has no evidence (w∅) 
increases relatively more than the wages in the other states.  Intuitively, a risk averse 
agent with better outside opportunities is less likely to accept a contract in which he may 
be punished even though he has worked hard.  
For a high enough reservation utility, we show that the agent’s wage is made 
independent of the supervisor’s report as long as this report does not reveal shirking (r = 21 
 
0).  If the supervisor reveals shirking, the agent is punished with a zero wage.  This 
sanction is relatively more severe when the outside opportunities are high.  This could be 
an explanation for why developing countries with weaker outside opportunities for their 
workers may suffer more from extortion.  Our result is also consistent with the argument 
that economic agents such as bureaucrats with high salaries are less susceptible to 
corruption.  Often such a claim relies on the decreasing marginal utility of income or an 
efficiency-wage argument.  Our argument is different.  In our model, as outside 
opportunities grow, the agent’s wage increases but his rent does not.  The supervisor’s 
report can be used to reduce the agent’s exposure to risk, provided he works, and 
extortion becomes less of an issue at the same time.  We summarize our result in the 
proposition below. 
Proposition 3: If the agent’s reservation utility is high enough, extortion is not a relevant 
issue for the principal. 
Proof: See Appendix F. 
 
Technically, we show in the appendix F that the optimal contract derived by only 
deterring bribery also deters extortion when the reservation utility is high enough.  The 
reason is that an increase in the agent’s reservation utility forces an increase in w∅ in 
order satisfy the (IR) constraint.  However, such an increase would violate the (IC) unless 
wH and w1 are increased as well.  The (CICs) require the same total payments in each 
state so the principal gains by not increasing w1 at the same rate as w∅ because by doing 
so it can decrease the reward s∅.  For a high enough reservation utility, we obtain w∅ = 
w1, which implies that s∅ = 0 = s1 and extortion ceases to be a relevant threat.  The 
optimal contract is therefore similar to the LCCP contract.   
  Of course, if the reservation utility is increased further, the wages w∅ = w1 are 
increased to the point where w∅ = w1 = wH and the first best is reached.  The threat of a 
large penalty (w0 = 0) if the agent is found shirking is enough to provide the agent an 
incentive to work.  
 22 
 
5.3. Generalizing the production technology: possibility of success after low effort 
One simplifying assumption of our model was that low effort always yielded a low 
output.  In this section we consider the more general case where low effort can also yield 
a high output, which corresponds to a situation where the agent can get lucky, and we 
show that our main results generalize.  The main findings are that extortion remains a 
threat after low output, but it is not relevant after high output.  When output is low, 
bribery is allowed and extortion is deterred, but when output is high, both bribery and 
extortion are deterred. 
We outline the extended model and the intuition before presenting the technical 
details.  Suppose the likelihood of producing the high output is π1 when e = 1, and it is π0 
when e = 0, where Δ = π1 - π0 > 0.  The payments to the agent and supervisor will depend 
on the output and the supervisor’s report, and they are denoted by wr
j, and sr
j, where j = L, 
H, for the two output levels, and r = 0, ∅, and 1 are the supervisor’s reports.   
To grasp the intuition, recall first that so far a high output was an absolute 
guarantee of high effort, but now a high output could result from a low effort by a lucky 
agent.  Therefore, the principal will want to send the supervisor even after high output.  
The high output is more likely after a high effort than a low effort.  Therefore, given a 
null signal ∅, it is more likely that a high effort was exerted when the output is high 
compared to when the output is low.
23  Consequently, raising the wage w∅
H
 (after high 
output and null report) helps incentives, whereas raising the wage w∅
L (after low output 
and null report) hurts incentives.  Thus, when facing the threat of bribery, the principal 
deters bribery by raising w∅
H all the way to w1
H and removes the stake of bribery.  This 
way of fighting bribery does not induce a threat of extortion unlike providing a reward to 
the supervisor.  However, after low output, the principal cannot increase w∅
L as it would 
have a negative incentive effect.  The alternative method of fighting bribery, a reward to 
the supervisor, would introduce a threat of extortion as in our main model.  Thus, the 
principal finds it optimal to allow bribery after low output, and we find that our main 
result generalizes – a fear of inducing extortion can make bribery optimal. 
                                                           
23 We assume that the null signal is equally likely after a high output or low output. 23 
 
It is instructive to study the agent’s incentive constraint if the supervisor were 
incorruptible.  It is given by, 
(IC)  π1 [pu(w1
H) + (1 – p) u(w∅
H)]  + (1 – π1) [pu(w1
L) + (1 – p) u(w∅
L)] – ϕ ≥   
π0 [pu(w0
H) + (1 – p) u(w∅
H)]  + (1 – π0) [pu(w0
L) + (1 – p) u(w∅
L)], 
which, after rearranging becomes, 
  π1 pu(w1
H) + Δπ(1 – p) u(w∅
H) – π0 pu(w0
H) + 
 (1  –  π1)pu(w1
L) – Δπ(1 – p) u(w∅
L) – (1 – π0) pu(w0
L) ≥ ϕ 
The main points of interest are the two wages following the signal ∅, when the supervisor 
finds no conclusive evidence of effort.  It is immediate that the w∅
H helps incentives 
(positive coefficient), while w∅
L hurts incentives (negative coefficient).  Therefore, the 
principal prefers to have a positive w∅
H but would like to set w∅
L = 0.  The complete 
contract when the supervisor is incorruptible is derived in Appendix G.1. 
Now consider the case where the supervisor may accept a bribe, but extortion is 
detected at zero cost.  Coalitional incentive constraints would imply that the total 
transfers to the coalition (s + w) is constant given the output level as in our main model.  
Given an output, the principal makes the same total payment regardless of the 
supervisor’s report.  Therefore, the principal’s incentive to set w∅
j is be entirely driven by 
the (IC).  After high output, the principal fights bribery by removing the stake of a bribe 
(w1
H = w∅
H > 0), while after low output, it fights bribery by rewarding the supervisor (w1
L 
= s∅
L > 0 = w∅
L) as in our main model.  Therefore, it is only after low output that 
extortion could become an issue if it could not be detected.  The details of this contract 
are derived in Appendix G.2. 
When extortion cannot be detected, it is straightforward to derive the optimal 
contract using arguments similar to those to prove proposition 1.  We show that our result 
generalizes to this case where the agent can be lucky after shirking.  A threat of extortion 
can make bribery optimal – the principal finds it optimal to allow bribery when the 
supervisor finds no conclusive evidence after low output.  These results are summarized 
in the following proposition. 24 
 
Proposition 4.  If the agent can also produce high output with low effort and it is optimal 
to use the supervisor, then bribery is allowed after low output but deterred after high 
output; extortion is always deterred. 
Proof:  The complete proof is available from the authors. 
6. Conclusion 
This paper builds on a key intuition that has not played much of a role in the literature on 
corruption in hierarchies: rewards to enforcement agents to turn down bribes may also 
encourage them to engage in extortion.  Tirole (1986) showed that a corruptible 
supervisor can still be useful, but his model and much of the subsequent literature did not 
feature the effect of extortion since extortion was not a credible threat in these models.  
Highlighting the team aspect of forging information, we introduce an appropriate notion 
of soft information.  This allows us to present a model of extortion in which the 
supervisor remains useful even when there is no external honest enforcement available. 
This trade-off creates an interlinking of the bribery and extortion constraints in the 
principal’s maximization problem and causes a failure of Tirole’s collusion-proofness 
principle.  Our main contribution is to show that bribery may be optimal due to the threat 
of extortion.
24  It is important to underline that the trade-off only appears if information is 
soft.  If information is hard, there is no such trade-off and bribery does not occur in 
equilibrium.  Our results suggest that organizations that must rely on soft information 
may also need to allow bribery.  By making its information “harder” an organization will 
suffer less from corruption, but making information harder can be costly.  For instance, 
speeding tickets should rely on sophisticated cameras or shareholders ought to be able to 
appeal auditing reports to reliable and incorruptible experts.  Developing countries with 
less resources and technological abilities, and weak legal environment also have less 
capability to make information hard and, therefore, we should expect that bribery to be a 
                                                           
24 While there are many reported examples of explicit bribery in the media, an interesting example of 
allowing collusion/bribery in organizations is a leniency bias in job performance appraisal.  Our result 
provides one rationale for why many organizations which use job performance appraisal as an incentive 
device may allow a leniency bias.  See Bretz et. al (1992) for a survey on studies related to this issue, and 
Johnson and Liebcap (1989) for an example of leniency in the federal government. 25 
 
more pervasive problem.  Again the reason is that they do not have the ability to rely on 
hard information.  The fight against corruption should therefore focus on the reliance on 
hard evidence.   
One implication of bribery occurring in equilibrium is to validate in a model the 
popular notion that bribery can be useful to “grease the wheels” in inefficient 
organizations.  However, it must be kept in mind that this is a second-best result.  More 
specifically, bribery is optimal in our model because it allows the principal to cause a 
variation in the agent’s payoffs when direct payments from the principal would only have 
resulted in introducing extortion, which is a worse problem.  Extortion penalizes an agent 
after “good” behavior, while bribery at least imposes some penalty for “bad” behavior.   
Our analysis provides a ranking of different forms of corruption.  It demonstrates 
the significance of relying on hard information and of the availability of honest external 
enforcement.  For example, if there were incorruptible enforcement agents available to 
detect and sanction corrupt behavior at a low enough enforcement cost, it would be 
possible to eliminate bribery in equilibrium.  Note that there is a difference between 
bribery and extortion since the former relies on cooperation but not the latter.  Thus, 
bribery would not be reported other than by whistleblowers, but extortion may be 
relatively easier to deter using an appeals process for agents subject to extortion.  Still 
detection of extortion is usually not perfect because, e.g., extortion reports may be seen as 
malevolent.
 25  Again we find that developed countries with well-developed legal and 
institutional structures are more likely to be able to thwart extortion, and extortion may 
have a more serious impact in the developing world.  It is well known that policing the 
police is not an easy task, and incorruptible enforcement agents may be scarce and 
expensive in many contexts.   
                                                           
25 Furnivall (1956) studying bribery and extortion in Burma noted “Those who gained their ends by bribery 
naturally made no complaint, and complaints from those who suffered were suspect as malicious.  Such 
evidence as was available mostly came from people who had given bribes and, as accomplices, their 
evidence, even if admissible, was doubtful.  It was difficult and dangerous for any private individual to set 
the law in motion, and in practice this was hardly possible except by some local or departmental superior of 
the man suspected of corruption.”  Klitgaard (1988) discussing tax assessor extortion noted that the appeal 
process is not straightforward:  “In one of the most notorious versions [of extortion] a tax assessor would 
slap an unrealistically high assessment on the taxpayer. The taxpayer could appeal, but that would take time 
and effort; furthermore, the taxpayer might not be sure what the ‘correct’ tax really was.” 26 
 
Appendix A    Incorruptible Supervisor 
Suppose the supervisor always reports truthfully what he has observed.  The agent’s 
participation and incentive constraints are as follows: 
(IR)     πu(wH) + (1 – π) [pu(w1) + (1 – p) u(w∅)] – ϕ ≥  0, 
(IC)     πu(wH) + (1 – π) [pu(w1) + (1 – p) u(w∅)] – ϕ ≥  pu(w0) + (1 – p) u(w∅,) 
 or,    πu(wH) + (1 – π) pu(w1) – π(1 – p) u(w∅) – pu(w0) ≥  ϕ . 
Given limited liability, and since zero effort entails zero cost, the incentive constraint will 
imply that the participation constraint is satisfied in each of the cases we consider. The 
supervisor's participation constraint is also satisfied due to limited liability. Thus, we will 
ignore both the agent's and the supervisor's participation constraints from now on. 
The principal’s program when the supervisor is truthful, P
t, can be written as 
follows: 
Min  π(wH) + (1 – π) [p(w1 + s1) + (1 – p) (w∅ + s∅)]  
s.t.    (IC), wH ≥ 0, wr ≥ 0 and sr ≥ 0, where r ∈ {0, ∅, 1}. 
  
 
The principal’s problem has the following Lagrangian: 
L = π(wH) + (1 – π) [p(w1 + s1) + (1 – p) (w∅ + s∅)]  
– λ [πu(wH) + (1 – π) pu(w1) – π(1 – p) u(w∅) – pu(w0) – ϕ] 
with the additional non-negativity constraints where λ ≥ 0 is the Lagrange multiplier. 
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∂ = (1 – π) (1 – p)  + λ π(1 – p) u′ (w∅) ≥ 0;  w∅  L
w∅
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∂ = (1 – π) (1 – p) ≥  0;     s∅  L
s∅
⎛⎞ ∂ ⎜⎟ ∂ ⎝⎠
 = 0,    (a6) 
 
plus the complementary slackness conditions for the constraints. 
From (a3), (a5) and (a6), we have w∅  = 0, s1 = 0 and s∅ = 0.  Since s0 does not 
enter the Lagrangian, it can be any non-negative number and the principal’s expected cost 
is independent of s0. 
 
Now suppose that λ = 0. From (a1) and (a2), we have wH = w1 = 0, which violates 
the constraint (IC).  The assumption that λ = 0 leads to a contradiction.  Hence λ > 0 and 
(IC) is binding.  Now (a4) implies that w0 = 0. 
The result of  λ > 0 also implies that wH = w1 > 0.  First we argue that both wages 





∂ > 0, then wH =0 and 1-λu′
(0)>0, but then (a2) implies that 1-λu′ (w1)>0 since w1 ≥ 0 and u″  < 0.  This would 
















∂ = 0. which leads to λ =  1
'( )




L uw .  Finally, using 
wH = w1 in (IC), we have  () 0
1
1 ;      0. (1 ) H ww u ww p
ϕ
ππ ∅
− == == +− .   
 
Appendix B    Proof of Lemma 1 
 
In the problem P
o of section 4, we will first ignore the constraint (EF0) and verify later 
that it is satisfied by the optimal contract.  Using (2) to replace s« everywhere, we can 
rewrite (EF1) as (EF1
b) and state the principal’s problem as follows: 
 28 
 
Min πwH + (1 – π) (w1 + s1), 
s.t.  
(IC)   π u(wH) + (1 – π) pu(w1) – π(1 – p) u(w∅) – pu(w0) ≥ ϕ, 
(EF1
b)   w« ≥ w1, 
(1)   s0 = w1 + s1 – w0, 
and the non-negativity constraints. 
 
Note that once we ignore (EF0), the variable s0 does not appear anywhere else in the 
problem except in (1).  Therefore, we are free to choose s0 to satisfy this constraint (1) as 
long as s0 ≥ 0.  We can now set up the following Lagrangian for this problem: 
L = π(wH) + (1 – π) (w1 + s1)  
– δ1 [πu(wH) + (1 – π) pu(w1) – π(1 – p) u(w∅) – pu(w0) – ϕ] 
– δ2 (w∅ – w1), 
with the additional non-negativity constraints. 
 
























∂ = δ1 π(1 – p) u′ (w∅) – δ2 ≥  0;     w∅ ( L
w∅
∂




















∂ ) = 0,    (b5), 
plus the complementary slackness conditions for the constraints. 
From (b5), we have s1= 0 since (1 – π) > 0. This result, (EF1), and limited liability 
imply that s∅ = 0.  Thus, we have w1 = w∅ from (2).   
Now suppose that δ1 = 0. From (b1) and (b2), we have wH = w1 = 0, which 
violates the constraint (IC).  The assumption that δ1 = 0 leads to a contradiction.  Hence 
δ1 > 0, (IC) is binding.   29 
 
The result of δ1 > 0 also implies that wH  > 0 because condition (b1) is violated if 





∂ = 0 and δ1 = 
1/u′(wH).  
Now (b4) implies that w0 = 0, which leads to w1 = s0
 from (1).   
Since we showed above that w1 = w∅, then using condition (b2) and (b3), we have 





∂ +  L
w∅
∂
∂  = (1 – π)  – δ1 (p – π)  u′ (w1) ≥ 0 









∂ is always strictly positive, which means w1 = w∅
 = 0 since at least one of them 
must be zero.  From (IC), we have wH = 
1(/) u ϕ π
− . The contract becomes equivalent to 
the case when the supervisor is not available. 
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∂ > 0, then we have w1 = w∅
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w∅
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∂ < 0 





∂ +  L
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∂












The above equation gives us values of wH and w1 = w∅ with binding (IC).  Finally, s0 = 
w1 is given by (1) and note that the ignored constraint (EF0) is satisfied in each case.      É 
 
Appendix C   Proof of Lemma 2  
 
We proceed in steps.  First, we show that the agent receives the same payoff from Nash 
bargaining for σ œ {«, 1} if the constraint (EF1) is violated, but the supervisor earns an 
ex ante rent.  We then show that there exists a corruption-proof contract that achieves the 
same cost but is more costly than the least-cost corruption-proof contract.  This proves 30 
 
the claim.  [Note that the least-cost corruption-proof contract is strictly better since it also 
pays the agent the same wage for σ œ {«, 1} but the supervisor earns no ex ante rent.] 
 
(i) If (EF1) is violated, i.e., s1 < s∅, then the agent gets identical payoffs for σ = ∅ or σ = 
1; the same is true for the supervisor. 
 
Define Tk: Tk = wk + sk for k = {0, ∅, 1}, and define m by Tm = max {T0, T∅, T1}.  Then 
define  wrσ and srσ as the agent and the supervisor’s respective payoffs (from Nash 
bargaining where relevant) when the signal is σ and the supervisor reports r.   
 
(a) If Tm = T∅: Given s1 < s∅, the supervisor will report r = ∅ when σ = {∅, 1}, and the 
agent will not find it profitable to bribe the supervisor into announcing r = 1. Therefore, 
payoffs will be: wm1 = wm∅ = w∅ ; sm1 = sm∅ = s∅. 
 
(b) If Tm > T∅: The supervisor reports r = m and the coalition receives Tm for σ = {∅, 1}.  
Their payoffs are given by Nash bargaining.  Since only the supervisor reports, the threat 
point is r = ∅ for σ œ {∅, 1} since s1 < s∅.  The bargaining problem is given by 
  () ( )
1
, max ( ) ( )
. .      ,
ws
m
uw uw s s





where α œ (0, 1) is the agent’s bargaining power.  The solution is denoted by wmσ and smσ 
for σ œ {∅, 1}.  Since the bargaining set and the threat point remain unchanged whether 
σ = ∅ or 1, their respective payoffs must also remain unchanged.  They are: wm1 = wm∅; 
sm1 = sm∅ > 0 since s∅ > s1 ≥ 0. 
 
Therefore, from (a) and (b), we have proved that wm1 = wm∅ regardless of m. 
 
(ii) Expected cost of any contract that induces e = 1 but violates (EF1). 
Consider the contract denoted by  ˆˆ ˆ {,, } H rr ww s that  induces  e = 1, but violates (EF1), 
1 ˆˆ ss ∅ > .  Then the expected cost is:  31 
 
π ( ˆH w ) + (1 – π) ( l
m T ) where  l
m T  = max { l
0 T ,  l T ∅,  l
1 T }, 
and  ˆˆ ˆ {,, } H rr ww s satisfy the (IC) constraint: 
(IC)  π u( ˆH w ) + (1 – π){p u( 1 ˆm w ) + (1 - p) u( ˆm w ∅)} - ϕ ≥ p u( 0 ˆm w ) + (1 - p) u( ˆm w ∅). 
Define  1 ˆ ˆˆ mm m Ww w ∅ ==,  1 ˆ ˆˆ mm m Sss ∅ ==and simplify (IC):
26 
(IC)  π u( ˆH w ) + (p – π) u(l
m W ) – ϕ ≥ p u( 0 ˆm w )  
Note that 
m S   > 0 since the supervisor receives at least  ˆ s∅   from Nash bargaining 
and 1 ˆˆ 0 ss ∅ >≥ . 
(iii) Implement e = 1 with a (constructed) corruption-proof contract { , , } H rr ww s ′′ ′  that has 
the same expected cost as  ˆˆ ˆ {,, } H rr ww s. 
Construct { , , } H rr ww s ′′ ′  by defining:  H w′  =  ˆH w ,  1 w′  = w∅ ′  = l
m W ,  0 w′ = 0,  1 s′  =  s∅ ′  = 
m S , 
and  0 s′ =  l
m T . 
 
Check that { , , } H rr ww s ′′ ′  is indeed corruption-proof and implements e = 1: 
(CIC) is satisfied since   k w′ +  k s′  =  l
m T ,   k ∈ {0, ∅, 1}, 
(EFk) is satisfied since    k s′ ≥  s∅ ′    k  ∈ {0, 1}, and 
(IC) is satisfied since    w'k must satisfy (IC) given that  ˆk w  satisfies (IC) where k ∈ 
{H, m0, m∅, m1} and given that  0 w′  ≤  ˆm w ∅ . 
 
Finally, note that { , , } H rr ww s ′′ ′  is not the least-cost corruption-proof contract since 
m S  > 0, 
whereas in least-cost corruption-proof contract 
0
1 s =
0 s∅ = 0.  Therefore, the least-cost 
opportunity-proof contract strictly dominates both { , , } H rr ww s ′′ ′  and  ˆˆ ˆ {,, } H rr ww s.   É 
 
                                                           
26 Note that s0 could be larger or smaller than s∅ – both cases are captured in  0 ˆm w . 32 
 
Appendix D   Proof of the Proposition 1 
 
The agent-supervisor coalition will choose the report to maximize their joint payoff, 
which will be Tm.  Note that since we do not impose (CIC) constraints bribery may 
potentially occur.  Then the objective function becomes 
π wH + (1 – π) Tm 
From lemma 2 we know that the (EF1) must be satisfied: 
(EF1)   s1 ≥ s«. 
The (IC) constraint is: 
π u( H w ) + (1 – π) p u( 1 m w ) –  π (1 – p) u( m w ∅) – p u( 0 m w ) – ϕ ≥ 0, 
where  r w σ denotes the agents payoff from Nash bargaining when the report is r and the 
signal is σ.  We ignore the constraint (EF0) for now and verify later that it is indeed 
satisfied by the optimal contract.   
 
We consider three cases depending on whether m = 1, ∅, or 0 respectively, and show that 
case I is optimal. 
 
Case I: Tm = T1 
Min π wH + (1 – π) T1 
(IC)   π u( H w ) + (1 – π) p u(w1) –  π (1 – p) u(w1∅) – p u(w10) – ϕ ≥ 0 
(EF1) s1 ≥ sφ 
 
We make some observations to simplify the optimization problem.   
(a) Note that  1 m w  = w1 because s1 ≥ s∅ and Tm = T1.  The Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS) 
implies that s11 = s1, and w11 = w1.   
 
(b) T0 = T1 and w0 = 0:  To see this, note that w0 and s0 only appear in (IC) through w10. 
By setting s0 = T1 and w0 = 0 the principal can make w10 = 0 and this does not cost the 
principal anything since s0 does not appear in the objective function. Given that s0 = T1 
and w0 = 0, T0 = T1. 33 
 
Since s0 = T1, we have s0 ≥ s∅, and (EF0) is satisfied. 
 
(c) w∅ = 0: To see this, note that w∅ does not appear in objective function and enters only 
the (IC) through w1∅ via the threat-point payoff of the agent in the Nash bargaining 
problem.  The Nash bargaining problem that determines w1∅ and s1∅ is given by 




max ( ) ( )
. .     
ws uw uw s s





It can be shown that a decrease in w∅ decreases w1∅.  Therefore, from the (IC) w∅ = 0.  
 
 
(d) s∅ = s1: To see this note that s∅ does not appear in objective function and enters only 
the (IC) through w1∅  via the threat-point payoff of the supervisor.  It can also be shown 
that an increase in s∅ reduces w1∅.  Therefore, from the (IC) the principal can raise s∅ 
until (EF1) binds and thus s∅ = s1. 
 
(e) s1 = 0:  In the Nash bargaining problem, s = s1 + w1 – w.  Since s∅ = s1, the bargaining 
problem becomes max (u(w))
α (w1 – w)
1-α, which is independent of s1.  Therefore, s1 can 
be reduced to zero to minimize the objective function. 
 
Given (a), (b), (c), (d), (e) and the binding (IC) constraint, we can write the Lagrangian as 
follows: 
 
















∅ ] = 0   (d2) 
 


























∅  > 0, 
and therefore u′(wH) < u′(w1), which implies wH > w1. 
 
The solution is such that wH > w1 > 0 = s1 = s∅ = w∅ = w0 and s0 = w1 = T1.  Note that the 
(CIC) is violated when σ = ∅  – the coalition is strictly better off by reporting r = 1 or r 
= 0. 
 
Case II: Tm = T∅ 
Min π wH + (1 – π) T∅ 
(IC)   π u( H w ) + (1 – π) p u(w∅1) –  π (1 – p) u(w∅) – p u(w∅0) – ϕ ≥ 0 
(EF1)   s1 ≥ s∅ 
 
We make some observations to simplify the optimization problem.   
 
(a) w∅ ≥ w1: To see this, note that T∅ ≥ T1 and s1 ≥ s∅. 
 
(b) s0 = T∅ and w0 = 0: To see this note that s0 and w0 only appear in (IC) through w∅0. 
By setting s0 = T∅ and w0 = 0, the principal can make w∅0 = w0 = 0 since s0 does not 
appear in the objective function.  Given s0 = T∅  and w0 = 0, we have T0 = T∅.  Note also 
that (EF0) is satisfied since s0 = T∅ ≥ s∅. 
 
(c) w1 = w∅: To see this, note that w1 only appears in (IC) through w∅1 via the threat point 
payoff of the agent.  Therefore the principal can increase w∅1 and relax the (IC) by 
increasing w1.  Since w∅ ≥ w1 from (a), w1 will be increased until w1 = w∅. 
 
(d) s1 = s∅: To see this, note that s1 only enters (IC) through w∅1.  The principal can 
increase w∅1 by reducing s1 since s1 is the threat-point payoff of the supervisor.  It can 35 
 
also be shown that a decrease in s1 reduces w∅1.  Therefore, from the (IC), the principal 
can reduce s1 until (EF1) binds and thus s1 = s∅. 
 
(e) w∅1 = w∅ = w1: To see this, note that s1 = s∅, w1 = w∅ and T1 = T∅. 
 
(f) s∅ = 0: given that w∅0 = 0, s∅ only appears in the objective function and therefore can 
be reduced to zero.  
 
Also, since T∅ = T1 = w1, we can rewrite the minimization problem as  
 
Min π wH + (1 – π) w1 
(IC)   π u( H w ) + (p – π) u(w1) – ϕ ≥ 0 
And the Lagrangian is:  
L = π wH + (1 – π) w1 + λ [ π u( H w ) + (p – π) u( 1 w ) – ϕ].  










∂  = (1 – π) – λ (p – π) u′(w1) = 0    (d4) 
Therefore, we have shown that the optimal contract under case II is the least-cost-
corruption-proof contract. 
 
Case III: Tm = T0 
Min π wH + (1 – π) T0 
(IC)   π u( H w ) + (1 – π) p u(w01) – π (1 – p) u(w0∅) – p u( 0 w ) – ϕ ≥ 0 
(EF1)   s1 ≥ s∅ 
 
We make a few observations to simplify the optimization problem. 
 
(a) s0 = T0 and w0 = 0: To see this, note that in the NBS w01 and w0∅ are not affected by 
the distribution of T0 between s0 and w0 as long as w0 + s0 remains the same.  Note that by 36 
 
reducing w0, (IC) can be relaxed and the objective function reduced.  Therefore the 
principal sets w0 = 0 and s0 = T0.  Note that (EF0) is also satisfied since s0 = T0 = Tm ≥ s∅. 
 
(b) s1 = s∅ and w1 + s1 = T0: To see this, note that s1 and w1 only affect w01.  By 
decreasing s1 and increasing w1, w01 can be increased and (IC) relaxed.  Therefore, s1 is 
reduced until (EF1) binds, and thus s1 = s∅.  And w1 is increased until w1 + s1 = T0 since 
T0 is Tm.  
 
(c) s∅ = w∅ = 0: To see this, note that in the Nash bargaining problem s = w1 + s1 – w 
since T1 = T0.  Since s1 = s∅, the Nash bargaining problem that determines w0∅ becomes  
  [ ]
1
1 max ( ) ( ) ( )
w uw uw w w
α α −
∅ −−  
which is independent of s∅.  Therefore, s∅ is reduced to zero to relax the (IC) since (EF1) 
binds from (b).  Reducing s∅ allows the principal to reduce s1 and increases w01 to relax 
the (IC).  From the NBS w0∅ is reduced by decreasing w¯ to zero and therefore relaxing 
the (IC).  Finally, since s1 = s∅ = 0, w1 = T0. 
 
We have proved that the optimization problem and thus the solution for case III is 
identical to case I.  Therefore to find the optimal solution, we only need to compare cases 
I and II which we do now. 
 
(Case I) Min π wH + (1 – π) w1 subject  to 
(IC)   π u(wH) + (1 – π) p u(w1) – π (1 – p) u(w1∅) – ϕ = 0 
 
(Case II) Min π wH + (1 – π) w1   subject to 
(IC)   π u(wH) + (p – π) u(w1) – ϕ = 0 
 
Since Nash bargaining implies w1∅ < w1 for α <1, the lowest expected cost under case II 
can be achieved under case I with a slack (IC).  Therefore, the optimal contract under 
case I results in a smaller expected cost than case II.  We have proved that case I is 
optimal, and it will induce bribery when σ = ∅.       37 
 
 
Appendix E     Proof of the Proposition 2 
 
(i) Consider case I in appendix D, which is the relevant case in equilibrium.  Recall the 
agent’s (IC) in equilibrium: 
(IC)   π u(wH) + (1 – π) p u(w1) – π (1 – p) u(w1∅) – ϕ = 0. 
It can easily be verified that, in state σ = ∅, the agent’s payoff w1∅ from the Nash 
bargaining solution increases with the agent’s bargaining power α.  Therefore, a decrease 
in α will make the (IC) slack and increase the principal’s payoff. 
 
(ii) We first characterize the optimal contract where extortion is deterred at zero cost.  
Then we show that the principal’s payoff from the optimal contract approaches the 
principal’s payoff from this contract as the agent’s bargaining power goes to zero. 
 
(a) Optimal contract where extortion is deterred at zero cost: Since bribery is still an 
issue, Collusion Incentive Compatibility (CIC) constraints must be added to the 
principal’s problem in appendix A but not the (EF) constraints.  By plugging s0 and s∅ 
from (1) and (2) into the principal’s objective function and constraint (IC), we can set up 
the following Lagrangian for this problem: 
L = π(wH) + (1 – π) (w1 + s1)  
– μ [πu(wH) + (1 – π) pu(w1) – π(1 – p) u(w∅) – pu(w0) – ϕ] 
with the additional non-negativity constraints. 
 
























∂ = μ π(1 – p) u′ (w∅) ≥ 0;      w∅ ( L
w∅
∂





















∂ ) = 0,    (e5) 
plus the complementary slackness conditions for the constraints. 
From (e5), we have s1= 0. 
Now suppose that μ  = 0. From (e1) and (e2), we have wH = w1 = 0, which violates the 
constraint (IC). The assumption that μ  = 0 leads to a contradiction. Hence μ  > 0 and (IC) 
is binding. 
Now (e3) and (e4) imply that w∅ = w0 = 0, which leads to s0 = s∅ = w1 from (1) 
and (2) respectively. 
The result of μ > 0 also implies that wH > 0 because condition (1) is violated if we 





















∂  = 0 








,       ( e 6 )  
and the binding (IC): 
π u(wH) + (1 – π) p u(w1) – ϕ  =   0 .       ( e 7 )  
Thus, the optimal contract where is extortion is deterred at zero cost, denoted by ω
b, has 
the following features: wH > w1 = s∅ = s0 > 0 = w∅ = w0 = s1. 
 
(b) The principal’s payoff from the optimal contract as the agent’s bargaining power 
goes to zero: Consider the optimal contract derived from case I in appendix D.  As α → 
0, we know from the NBS that w1∅ → 0 since the agent’s threat point w∅ = 0.  Thus the 
principal’s problem from case I in appendix D simplifies to: 
 




π u(wH) + (1 – π) p u(w1) – ϕ = 0 
 



















Note that these conditions are identical to (e6) and (e7) that characterize the contract that 
would be offered if extortion is deterred at zero cost. 
 
(iii) The LCCP contract is optimal if the agent has all the bargaining power: Consider 
the optimal contract derived from case I in appendix D.  As α → 1, we know from the 
NBS that w1∅ → w1 since the supervisor’s threat point s∅ = 0.  Thus the principal’s 
problem from case I in appendix D simplifies to: 
 




π u(wH) + (p – π) p u(w1) – ϕ = 0 
 




















Note that these conditions are identical to the conditions in lemma 1 that characterize the 
LCCP contract.  É 
 
Appendix F     Proof of the Proposition 3 
In this appendix, we explain how our model changes when the agent’s reservation utility, 
denoted by u , is increased above zero.  We show that if u  is high enough, the least cost 
contract that deters bribery also deters extortion, which means that the LCCP contract is 
optimal.  Consider the principal’s problem P
0 from section 4 but assume that extortion 
can be deterred at zero cost.  That is, we can ignore the (EF) constraints and characterize 
the least cost contract that deters bribery when there is no fear of extortion.  We show that 
ignoring the (EF) constraints is without loss of generality if the agent’s reservation utility 
is high enough even if extortion could take place.   40 
 
Note that when u  > 0, the limited liability constraints no longer imply the (IR).  
Therefore, in the problem below, we add an (IR) to the principal’s problem P
0 from 
section 4 but ignore the (EF) constraints: 
 
Min πwH + (1 – π)[p(w1 + s1) + (1 – p)(w∅ + s∅)] 
s.t.  
(IC)   π u(wH) + (1 – π) pu(w1) – π(1 – p) u(w∅) – pu(w0) ≥ ϕ, 
(IR)   π u(wH) + (1 – π) pu(w1) + (1 – π)(1 – p) u(w∅) ≥ ϕ  + u , 
(1)   s0 = w1 + s1 – w0, 
(2)   s∅ = w1 + s1 – w∅, 
and the non-negativity constraints. 
 
We show next that if u  is high enough, the solution requires w1 = w∅, which implies that 
the (EF1) constraint is then redundant.  As earlier in appendix B, we ignore (1) and verify 
later that s0 satisfies (1).  We can also verify that s0 ≥ s∅ so that (EF0) is also redundant as 
was the case earlier.  Replacing s∅ everywhere using (2), we obtain the Lagrangian: 
         L = π wH + (1 – π) (w1 + s1)  
  – λ [π u(wH) + (1 – π) p u(w1) – π (1 – p) u(w∅) – p u(w0) – ϕ] 
 –  μ [π u(wH) + (1 – π) p u(w1) + (1 – π) (1 – p) u(w∅) – ϕ  – u ] 






∂ = π – λ π u
£(wH)  – μπ u
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∂ = λ π(1–p)u′(w∅) – μ(1–π)(1–p) u′(w∅) + δ ≥ 0;    w∅  L
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 = 0     (f5) 41 
 
There are two case depending on values of λ. 
 
(Case 1) λ > 0: 
λ > 0 implies that (IC) is binding and w0 = 0 from (f4). λ > 0 also leads to μ > 0 from (f3) 
as long as u  > 0.  Otherwise, w∅ = 0 from (f3) and this implies that (IR) is violated when 
u  > 0. 
(i) Subcase: δ = 0.  We have s1 = 0 from (f5) and this implies that w1 ≥ w∅ since s∅ = w1 
+ s1 – w∅ ≥ 0 from (2) the non-negativity constraint on s∅. 
  ⇒ u′(wH) = 
1
λ μ +
 and u'(w1) = 
1
() p λ μ +
 ⇒ wH > w1. 





(ii) Subcase: δ > 0.  First we have δ < (1 – π) from (f2) and this implies that s1 = 0 from 
(f5). This result with δ > 0 (so s∅ = 0) leads to w1 = w∅.   
From (f2) + (f3), we have u'(w1) = 
11
(1 ) ( ) p
π




 ⇒ wH > w1. 
 
(Case 2) λ = 0 
First we must have δ > 0 from (f3).  Otherwise (f3) implies μ = 0.  This is because, μ > 0 
in (f3) implies that u'(w∅) = 0, which would be a contradiction since it requires an 
unbounded w∅, which implies that (IR) is slack (μ =0).  Note that μ = 0 implies that wH = 
0 and w1 = 0 from (f1) and (f2) respectively. However, if this is the case, (IC) is violated. 
Since δ > 0, we have s∅ = 0.  Moreover, we have δ < (1 – π) from (f2) and this 
implies that s1 = 0 from (f5).  This result leads to w1 = w∅.  Note that w1 > 0, since 
otherwise we have u′(w1) unbounded and (f2) would then imply that μ = 0 since δ < (1-π).  
But that would imply that wH = 0 and (IC) would be violated. 
From (f2) and (f3), we have u’(w1) = 
1
μ
 ⇒ wH = w1, and we have the first best. 
By collecting results from the two cases, we conclude that the collusion-proof 
contract is extortion-proof for as long as u  ≥ u .  We obtain u  from the subcase (ii) of 42 
 





, and u'(w1) = 
1
() p λ μ +
 hold.  From (IR) and (IC), we 
have 




= , where we have the first best for u  ≥  ˆ u.  
In the main text we only considered the case where u  = 0.  For u  > 0, we will 
either be in the case 1(i), 1(ii), or 2.  Using an example, we show that all these cases exist 
and in the cases 1(ii) and 2, extortion is not relevant.    
Suppose p = π = 0.5, ϕ = 1.  We can show that u  = ¼, and  ˆ u = 1.  An increase in 
u  (above zero) implies an increase in w∅.  To prevent (IC) from being violated wH and 
w1 must increase in a proportion that satisfies the FOC u'(wH) = p u'(w1).  However, the 
rate of increase in wH and w1 will be lower than the one in w∅.  At a critical point of u , 
denoted by u , w∅ becomes the same as w1 and we switch between cases 1(i) and 1(ii).  
Beyond this point u , we are in case 1(ii) with w1 = w∅, and the value of w1 grows with 
u and approaches wH.  As u  becomes even larger, we reach another critical point of u , 
denoted by  ˆ u, and the first best is achieved: wH = w1 = w∅ (case 2).    É 
 
Appendix G.      Generalizing the Production Technology 
 
Appendix G.1.    Optimal Contract with an Incorruptible Supervisor 
Suppose the supervisor always reports truthfully what he has observed.  The agent’s 
participation and incentive constraints are as follows: 
(IR)   π1 [pu(w1
H) + (1 – p) u(w∅
H)]  + (1 – π1) [pu(w1
L) + (1 – p) u(w∅
L)] – ϕ ≥  0 
(IC)     π1 [pu(w1
H) + (1 – p) u(w∅
H)]  + (1 – π1) [pu(w1
L) + (1 – p) u(w∅
L)] – ϕ ≥   
π0 [pu(w0
H) + (1 – p) u(w∅
H)]  + (1 – π0) [pu(w0
L) + (1 – p) u(w∅
L)] 
      or,  π1 pu(w1
H)  + Δπ(1 – p) u(w∅
H) – π0 pu(w0
H)  
                              + (1 – π1)pu(w1
L) – Δπ(1 – p) u(w∅
L) – (1 – π0) pu(w0
L) ≥  ϕ 
Given limited liability, and since zero effort entails zero cost, the incentive constraint will 
imply that the participation constraint is satisfied in each of the cases we consider. The 43 
 
supervisor's participation constraint is also satisfied due to limited liability. Thus, we will 
ignore both the agent's and the supervisor's participation constraints from now on. 
The principal’s program when the supervisor is truthful, P
t, can be written as: 
Min  π1 [p(w1
H + s1
H) + (1 – p)(w∅
H + s∅
H)]  
+ (1 – π1)[p(w1
L + s1
L) + (1 – p)(w∅
L + s∅
L)] 
s.t.    (IC), wrH ≥ 0, wr
L ≥ 0, srH ≥ 0 and sr
L ≥ 0, where r ∈ {0, ∅, 1}. 
  
The principal’s problem has the following Lagrangian: 
L = π1 [p(w1
H + s1
H) + (1 – p) (w∅
H + s∅
H)]  
+ (1 – π1) [p(w1
L + s1
L) + (1 – p) (w∅
L + s∅
L)] 
– λ [π1 pu(w1
H)  + Δπ(1 – p) u(w∅
H) – π0 pu(w0
H) 
+ (1 – π1)pu(w1
L) – Δπ(1 – p) u(w∅
L) – (1 – π0) pu(w0
L) – ϕ] 
with the additional non-negativity constraints where λ ≥ 0 is the Lagrange multiplier. 






∂ = π1 p – λπ1 p u′ (w1












∂ = (1 – π1) p – λ(1 – π1) p u′ (w1






∂ ) = 0,    (g2) 
  H L
w∅
∂
∂ =  π1 (1 – p)  – λ Δπ(1 – p) u′ (w∅
H) ≥ 0;  w∅
H ( H L
w∅
∂
∂ ) = 0,    (g3) 
  L L
w∅
∂
∂ = (1 – π1) (1 – p)  + λ Δπ(1 – p) u′ (w∅
L) ≥ 0; w∅
L ( L L
w∅
∂






∂ = λ π0 p u′ (w0












∂ = λ (1 – π0) p u′ (w0






























∂ ) = 0,    (g8) 
  H L
s∅
∂
∂ = π1 (1 – p) ≥  0;     s∅
H ( H L
s∅
∂
∂ ) = 0,    (g9) 
  L L
s∅
∂




∂ ) = 0,    (g10) 44 
 
plus the complementary slackness conditions for the constraints. 
From (g4), (g7), (g8), (g9) and (g10), we have w∅
L  = 0, s1
H  = 0, s1
L  = 0,  s∅
H  = 
0 and s∅
L = 0. Since s0 does not enter the Lagrangian, it can be any non-negative number 
and the principal’s expected cost is independent of s0. 
Now suppose that λ = 0. From (g1), (g2) and (g3), we have w1
H = w1
L = w∅
H = 0, 
which violates the constraint (IC). The assumption that λ = 0 leads to a contradiction. 
Hence λ > 0 and (IC) is binding.  Now (g5) and (g6) imply that w0
H = w0
L = 0. 
  The result of  λ > 0 also implies that w
H = w1
L > w∅
H > 0. First we argue that 
those wages are positive and then show that w
H = w1
L > w∅





∂  > 0, then w1
H = 0 





∂ > 0 and  H L
w∅
∂
∂ > 0 
respectively since w1
L
 ≥ 0, w∅
H ≥ 0 and u″ < 0.  This would imply that w1
L = w∅









∂  = 0.  Likewise, λ 

















∂  > 0.  Then we have w∅
H = 0, and w1
H = w1
L > 0 must hold to satisfy (IC).  The 
assumption of  H L
w∅
∂
∂  > 0 also implies that λ u′(w1
H) π1(1 – p)  > λ Δπ(1 – p) u′(0) since 






∂  = 0.  But π1 u′(w1
H) is always smaller than Δπ u′(0) since u′(0) 
= + ∞.  Therefore, we have  H L
w∅
∂

















H > 0.  Finally, the values of w1
H, w1
L and w∅















H)  + Δπ(1 – p) u(w∅
H) = ϕ  are satisfied.  Collecting our 
results gives us: w1
H = w1
L > w∅












Appendix  G.2.    Optimal Contract with a Corruptible Supervisor, but where 
Extortion Deterred at Zero Cost 
Suppose now that the supervisor is corruptible, but that extortion is detected and deterred 
at zero cost.  The possibility of bribery introduces [CIC] constraints which will deter 
misreporting in lieu of a bribe.  We assume that the supervisor does not accept a bribe 
from the agent if she is indifferent. 
 [ CICσ, r]   Tσ
j ≥ Tr  
j,    
  where  Tσ = wσ + sσ, Tr = wr + sr,  forσ, r ∈ {0, ∅, 1} and j ∈ {L, H}. 
 







H, i.e., the aggregate transfers in every state with the same output must 





































L      (g14) 
 
The agent’s participation, incentive constraints and the supervisor’s participation 
constraint are the same as those when the supervisor is honest. Thus, the principal’s 
program which prevents collusion, P
CP, can be written as follows: 
 
  Min   π1[p(w1
H + s1
H) + (1 – p)(w∅
H + s∅
H)] + (1 – π1)[p(w1
L + s1
L) + (1 – p)(w∅
L + s∅
L)]  
    s.t. (IC), (g11), (g12), (g13), (g14), and the non-negativity constraints. 
 
Using (g12) and (g14) to replace s∅
H and s∅
L everywhere respectively, we can rewrite the 
constraints s∅
H ≥ 0 and s∅









L ≥  0       (g14)′ 46 
 
Note that the variable s0
H and s0
L do not appear anywhere else in the problem except in 
(g11) and (g13) respectively. Therefore, we are free to choose s0
H  and s0
L to satisfy 
constraints (g11) and (g13) as long as s0
H ≥ 0 and s0
L ≥ 0 respectively.  We can now set 
up the following Lagrangian for this problem: 
 
L = π1 (w1
H + s1
H)  + (1 – π1) (w1
L + s1
L)  
 – μ1 [π1 pu(w1
H)  + Δπ(1 – p) u(w∅
H) – π0 pu(w0
H)  
+ (1 – π1)pu(w1
L) – Δπ(1 – p) u(w∅
L) – (1 – π0) pu(w0
L) – ϕ] 
–  μ2 (w1
H + s1
H – w∅





with the additional non-negativity constraints. 
 





∂ = π1 – μ1 π1 p u′ (w1











∂ = (1 – π1)  – μ1 (1 – π1) p u′ (w1










∂ = – μ1 Δπ(1 – p) u′ (w∅
H) + μ2 ≥ 0;    w∅
H ( H L
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∂




∂ = μ1 Δπ(1 – p) u′ (w∅
L) + μ3 ≥ 0;    w∅
L ( L L
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∂ = μ1 π0 pu′ (w0











∂ = μ1 (1 – π0) pu′ (w0




























∂ ) = 0,    (g22) 
plus the complementary slackness conditions for the constraints. 
 
First, we show that μ2 > 0 and constraint (g12)′ is binding. Suppose that μ2 = 0. 
Then we have s1
H = 0 from (g21) and μ1 = 0 from (g17), which leads to that w1
H = 0 from 47 
 
(g15). These results imply that w∅
H = 0 from (g12)′.  There are two cases depending on 
value of μ3. Suppose (i) μ3 = 0. Then we have w1
L = 0 from (g16), which violates (IC). 
Now suppose (ii) μ3 > 0. This implies that constraint (g14)′ is binding and w∅
L = 0 from 
(g18), which in turn implies that w1
L = s1
L = 0. (IC) is violated again. The assumption that 
μ2  = 0 leads to a contradiction. 
Now we argue that the result of μ2 > 0 leads to μ1 > 0 and (IC) is binding. 
Suppose μ1 = 0 given that μ2 > 0. From (g17), we have w∅
H = 0, which implies that w1
H = 
s1
H = 0 since constraint (g12)′ is binding. There are also two cases depending on value of 
μ3. Suppose (i) μ3 = 0. From (g16), we have w1
L = 0, which violates (IC). Now suppose 
(ii) μ3 > 0, which implies that constraint (g14)′ is binding and w∅
L = 0 from (g18), which 
in turn implies that w1
L = s1
L = 0. (IC) is violated again. The assumption that μ1  = 0 leads 
to a contradiction.  
Now (g18), (g19) and (g20) imply that w∅
L = w0
H = w0
L = 0.  
The result of μ1 > 0 also implies that w1
H  > 0 because condition (g15) is violated 
if we assume that w1
H = 0 and thus u′ (w1
H)  = ∞.  Likewise, μ1 > 0 also implies that w1
L 





















∂ = π1 – μ1 π1 p u′ (w1
H) – μ1 Δπ(1 – p) u′ (w∅
H) ≥ 0. 
If we assume that w∅
H = 0 and thus u′ (w1
H)  = ∞, above condition is violated. Therefore, 
we have w∅
H > 0 and H L
w∅
∂
∂ = 0. The result of w1
L > 0 implies that μ3 = 0. If we assume 
that μ3 > 0 and thus (g14)′ is binding, then we have w1
L = 0 because w∅
L =0, which leads 






















∂  > 0, which lead to that s1
H = s1
L = 0. 
The results that s1




From (g17), we have μ2 = μ1Δπ(1 – p) u′ (w∅
H) since  H L
w∅
∂






∂  = 0, we have π1 – μ1 [π1p u′ (w1
H) + Δπ(1 – p) u′ (w∅
H)] = π1 – μ1 [π1p + 
Δπ(1 – p)] u′ (w1
H) = 0 since w1
H = w∅






















Finally, the values of w1
H, w1
L and w∅
H are determined such that both of (g23) and [π1 p  
+ Δπ(1 – p)] u(w1
H) + (1 – π1)pu(w1
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